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Trade and Immigration 
Implications for the U.S. Labor Market 
Lori G. Kletzer
University of California, Santa Cruz, and
Peterson Institute for International Economics
In the United States, debate and concern about trade and immigra-
tion, two of the major components of globalization, have focused to 
date on low and moderately skilled workers. This focus is changing. As 
trade in services expands and as attention is directed to American tech-
nological leadership and a high-skill workforce, the more highly-skilled 
sides of trade and immigration are emerging as topical concerns for 
policy and politics. With the growth of services trade and the potential 
for services offshoring, the set of workers at risk of job displacement 
has broadened from a production and manufacturing focus to include 
professionals, offi ce and administrative workers, and more generally 
the services sector. The migration of foreign-born skilled workers, par-
ticularly in the information technology sector, creates another outlet 
where more highly skilled domestic workers feel threatened by interna-
tional forces. While it might be an overstatement to conclude that trade 
and immigration are two sides of the same coin in the sense of posing 
foreign competition to American workers, there are informative par-
allels for policy analysis. Importantly, international trade (as the fl ow 
of goods and services) and immigration and migration (as the fl ow of 
potential labor) are two sides of the same coin from the perspective 
of measured impact. In both cases, measured impact (net benefi t) is a 
question of distribution: the net benefi ts of both are unevenly distrib-
uted. As Lowenstein (2006) notes, “Like any form of economic change, 
immigration causes distress and disruption to some” (pg. 71). Change 
one word, and the same sentence applies to trade. 
On the political and policy side, 2008 is an important time, and the 
window of opportunity may be open only for a short period. President 
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Bush’s trade promotion authority (TPA), formerly known as fast-track 
authority to negotiate trade agreements, expired at the end of June 2007, 
and TAA authorization expired that fall. It may not be an opportune time 
for the Bush administration to push for trade expansion. With the return 
of Congress to Democratic leadership following the midterm elections 
in November 2006, the ground has shifted on trade-related legislation. 
Passions about trade topics are running high, given the size of the cur-
rent account defi cit and the imbalance with China. The so-called social 
effects of trade are likely to get a louder hearing under Democrats. In 
particular, enforcing tougher labor standards for other countries within 
trade agreements will get some attention, which is due in no small part 
to strategic choices by organized labor. During the summer of 2007, 
Congress discussed (and ultimately failed to pass) a bipartisan immi-
gration compromise—potential legislation addressing undocumented 
migrants, a guest worker program, border security, and a point system 
for green cards. All of this activity is taking place amid broadening 
anxiety over the impact of trade and immigration at home. 
This chapter adds a focus on skilled migration, services trade, and 
offshoring to the existing assessment of the impact of trade and immi-
gration on the labor market and domestic workers. I review recent stud-
ies of services trade and offshoring in the context of more established 
analyses of manufacturing trade and production-worker job loss. On the 
immigration side, I examine issues and concerns regarding high-skill 
migration that add complexity to the ongoing debate on the domestic 
labor market impact of immigration, particularly that of undocumented 
migration. A concluding section offers policy recommendations. 
STARTING POINTS—A BRIEF SYNTHESIS OF 
THE LITERATURE
Trade: U.S. Gains from Global Integration; Trade-Related Job Loss
Almost without exception, economists view trade liberalization as a 
known and proven method of increasing national income. Comparative 
advantage, economies of scale, technological spillovers, and import 
competition are the main channels for (net) increases in national in-
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come. Production effi ciencies result from all four of these channels. Im-
port competition is the most controversial, in that when domestic fi rms 
lose market share or close, workers, fi rm owners, and communities lose 
sources of income and profi ts. It is widely agreed that the benefi ts are 
large and diffuse, and the costs relatively smaller and concentrated.1
There is a sizable literature quantifying the gains from trade and 
investment liberalization. Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer (2005) syn-
thesize a large number of studies using different methods and assump-
tions. The various estimates reveal substantial gains—on the order of 
$1 trillion annually—from past integration. The estimates are notable 
in size: “The estimated gain in 2003 income is in the range of $2,800 to 
$5,000 additional income for the average person and between $7,100 
and $12,900 for the average household” (pg. 68). Estimates of gains 
from future integration range from $450 billion to $1.3 trillion annually. 
Gains from future integration will be large because of the (likely) inclu-
sion of agriculture and services. Readers interested in a more detailed 
discussion of gains (from product variety to fi rm productivity) should 
consult Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer (2005).2 
Richardson (2004) provides a cogent summary of research detail-
ing the unevenness of gains. Firms that are globally engaged, through 
exports, imports, investment, outsourcing, and licensing, share distinc-
tive benefi ts. Some of these benefi ts include faster growth rates, lower 
risk of plant closure, and higher worker wages. The gains from import 
liberalization are broadly distributed.3 
Recent attention has been drawn to free-trade skeptics, economists 
whose writings have been interpreted as noting second thoughts about 
free trade. Examples include Samuelson (2004), Blinder (2006), and 
Rodrik (2006). In all cases, the remarks are not really new; rather, the 
remarks represent a change in tone (emphasizing distributional aspects 
over aggregate welfare gains), or a highlight of points known for some 
time but largely ignored. Samuelson (2004) is a prominent example 
in his consideration of the timely issue of technological progress and 
human capital advancement in developing countries. Samuelson’s ba-
sic point is that there are situations where free trade, in the context of 
changes in comparative advantage, is not always welfare-enhancing. He 
points out that in simple cases of (large) differences in labor productiv-
ity, free trade leads unambiguously to increases in national income for 
both countries. Yet in the case where a country (call it China) improves 
tb08fogjch4.indd   121 9/10/2008   12:45:25 PM
122   Kletzer
productivity in the goods it imports (and thus the goods that the United 
States exports), trade can be wiped out (if the productivity improve-
ment is just enough to equalize wage ratios), robbing the United States 
of the benefi ts of trade it previously enjoyed. In other words, technical 
progress in China can reduce the potential benefi ts of trade experienced 
by the United States. For example, if China began producing aircraft 
(a good it imports and the United States exports), the United States 
would be made worse off by the direct change in the terms of trade.4 As 
Panagariya (2004) notes, this point about productivity growth and tech-
nological change is not new; when the United States was growing faster 
than Europe in the 1950s, Europeans were concerned that U.S. growth 
might decrease their standard of living; when Japan was growing in the 
1960s and 1970s, the United States was concerned about Japan’s effects 
on American standards of living.5
In fairness to the aforementioned skeptics, none dispute the overall 
gains from trade. Rather, they take up reallocative costs and the uneven 
distribution of gains. Because traditionally the gains from free trade have 
played a much larger role in economic discourse than any discussion of 
the costs, there seems to be some notion of skepticism when infl uential 
scholars pick up the refrain that benefi ts are net, with often considerable 
gross costs. In part, this unevenness comes from the prominence of eco-
nomic theory, where, as noted by Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan 
(2004, pg. 111), “Popular economic models of trade, at least the basic 
ones . . . typically assume that workers who lose one job can readily fi nd 
another. . . . In the real world, workers may suffer through a period of 
joblessness and displacement.” These real-world questions are clearly 
empirical in nature. There are agents and units in the economy (work-
ers, fi rms, and communities) that bear costs because of fi rm closure, job 
loss, or reemployment at lower earnings. Community futures are often 
tied to employment opportunities. Scaling up summaries of microdata 
outcomes reported in Kletzer (2001), Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer 
(2005) estimate that U.S. trade-displaced manufacturing workers lose 
$54 billion in lifetime earnings. Yet federal government spending on 
programs explicitly tied to trade liberalization (such as Trade Adjust-
ment Assistance) is less than $2 billion annually, clearly far less than 
the worker costs and overwhelmingly smaller than the permanent gains 
from trade and investment liberalization. 
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The discussion here is hardly unique in noting the large and positive 
net benefi ts of free trade, and the corresponding ability of free trade’s 
“winners” to compensate the “losers,” based on the estimated sizes of 
benefi ts and costs. Within the economics literature, the presumption that 
the losers can be compensated (at least partially if not fully) is strong, 
and often seems to serve as adequate justifi cation for promoting policies 
that advance free trade. These presumptions work well in the academic 
literature but are problematic in any policy or political context. 
One key problem is that presumptions of an ability to compensate 
have only weakly translated into a record of compensation policies and 
programs. The record of trade liberalizations undertaken by the United 
States is not matched by a record of policies to compensate workers for 
their trade-related job losses. The creation of, and reforms to, Trade Ad-
justment Assistance (TAA) have some parallels to rounds of trade lib-
eralization, but the important dimension is in results, and on this score 
there is little sense that TAA brings to workers any form of adequate 
compensation.6
The highly visible nature of job loss, along with the failure of cur-
rent federal adjustment programs to compensate workers for their loss-
es, clearly weakens popular support for the view that economic integra-
tion brings widespread benefi ts. Yet opinions about trade liberalization 
do become more favorable when it is linked to worker adjustment pro-
grams (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). The public sense remains strong 
that fairness dictates compensation for workers affected by trade. Ac-
cess to a wider variety of goods, at lower prices, seems to be of little 
relief when accompanied by job insecurity. 
Immigration
Similar to trade, immigration imparts both benefi ts and costs to the 
United States.7 With the fl ow of people across borders, the benefi t/cost 
calculations are even more political and emotional, given the complexi-
ties of race, ethnicity, class, language, and geography. But the questions 
remain distributional ones: how much is lost by native workers com-
peting with immigrant labor; how much is gained by native workers 
complementary to immigrant labor; how much is gained by consumers 
of immigrant-produced goods and services (standard consumer benefi t 
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of a factor increase); and if immigration lowers the price of labor, what 
are the gains to employers?
Both academic and popular discussions of the impact of immigra-
tion on the employment opportunities of natives start with the basic 
textbook model of a competitive labor market where an infl ux of im-
migrant workers lowers the wage of competing (native) workers. (The 
earnings of complementary factors—whether labor or capital—in-
crease.) That is, immigrants represent an outward shift of the labor sup-
ply curve, along a downward sloping labor demand curve. Given the 
widespread appeal of a simple demand and supply model, there is often 
surprise that the literature provides mixed results. Measured impacts 
vary considerably across studies, and it is commonly concluded that the 
estimated effects cluster around zero (Borjas 2003; Friedberg and Hunt 
1995). More specifi cally, Friedberg and Hunt (1995, pg. 42) conclude 
strongly that “there is no evidence of economically signifi cant reduc-
tions in native employment.” On the wage side, estimated effects are 
truly small, with a 10 percent increase in the fraction of immigrants 
being associated with a 1 percent reduction in native wages. 
Skill is very much the essence of the question about the impact 
of immigration, and skill is strongly associated with country of origin. 
The European dominance of migration to the United States, stemming 
from the national origin quotas of the Immigrant and Nationality Act 
of 1924, have given way to an Asian, Mexican, and Central American 
dominance, following the establishment of preferences for family re-
unifi cation in the 1965 Immigration Act. Card (2005) reports, from the 
2000 census, that both recent and more established migrants include a 
much larger fraction of people with low levels of educational attain-
ment than is true for natives. About 40 percent of recent (less than fi ve 
years) and more established (fi ve-plus years) migrants are high school 
dropouts, as compared to 13 percent of natives. Card also notes that 
immigrants were 13 percent of the working-age population in the 2000 
census, yet they made up 28 percent of the population having less than 
a high school diploma. Thus, from a relative supply perspective (the 
basis of the straightforward demand and supply model), natives with 
the lowest levels of education are seen as those facing the greatest labor 
market competition from migrants, and most studies have focused on 
this group. This group has also faced potentially adverse consequences 
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from increasing manufacturing trade, from a stagnant minimum wage, 
and from declining unionization.
For economists, the debate about immigration is also methodologi-
cal. Exploiting the presence of many local labor markets in the United 
States with different fractions of immigrants and therefore different rel-
ative supplies of skilled labor, one approach uses a cross-city research 
design.8 If cities were closed economies, this approach might mimic the 
shift in labor supply associated with the textbook model. But cities are 
not isolated or closed; if natives respond to changes in price and wages, 
the impact of immigration may be diffused. In addition, migrants are 
not likely to be randomly distributed across cities, which means there 
is the potential for spurious correlations between migrant fl ows and 
changes in native employment opportunities. Recognizing the fl ow of 
goods and factors across local labor markets, the second approach is 
national, relating changes in relative outcomes to time-series changes 
in immigrant shares. This approach lacks a clear counterfactual (what 
would have happened without immigration), in part because of coinci-
dent time trends such as technological change.
Lewis (2005) takes on the interesting question of why local labor 
market outcomes of low-skilled natives are not much affected by rela-
tive supply shocks. Despite the large impact of immigrants on the rela-
tive supply of low-skilled workers, there is little impact on the wages 
of native low-skilled workers. He fi nds an absorption of unskilled im-
migrants within industries in high immigrant cities.9
MOVING UP THE SKILL LADDER: TRADE 
AND IMMIGRATION
Services Trade and Services Offshoring
Globalization, particularly globalized production, is evolving and 
broadening from manufacturing into services. Services activities have 
become increasingly tradable and now account for a larger share of 
global trade than in the past. Services trade has almost doubled over 
the past decade and a half: over the period 1990 to 2005, exports have 
increased from $189 billion to $353 billion, and imports have increased 
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from $143 billion to $267 billion (GPO Access 2007, Table B-25). 
These changes, and their implications for American fi rms and workers, 
have attracted widespread attention.
That trade is now different can be seen simply in the phrase “knowl-
edge industries.” Knowledge industries are characterized by a focus on 
creating value from new ideas and concepts, a notion that is different 
from creating value from material inputs and physical labor. Firms 
have always had ideas and used knowledge, of course, but now the out-
put is often information-based, intangible, or conceptual. Knowledge 
work and output includes areas such as software development, fi nan-
cial services, pharmaceuticals, engineering services, and biotechnol-
ogy. Knowledge work need not be “new”; it can include new products, 
services, and processes within older and more established industries 
such as architectural and accounting services. Trade in knowledge in-
dustries and in information technology–enabled service activities have 
broadened services trade beyond the traditional areas of transportation, 
travel, and tourism.
The growth in services trade is seen in Figure 4.1, which shows net 
exports of services.10 The United States is a net exporter of many ser-
vices, most prominently fi nancial services, business, professional and 
technical services, and education. The trade surplus in services is in 
contrast to goods trade, where imports exceed exports by a wide margin 
(Figure 4.2).
Services offshoring, which is the migration of jobs (but not the 
people performing them) across national borders (mostly from rich 
countries to poor ones), has received considerable attention since 2000. 
Fueled by the 2004 presidential race and continued slack in the labor 
market, the services-offshoring debate became headline material. The 
literature on services offshoring is expanding rapidly (see Jensen and 
Kletzer 2006 and Blinder 2006 for references).
The scope of the phenomenon is largely unknown because of a lack 
of data. Anxiety over services trade is often fueled by one simple statis-
tic: the large share of employment in the services sector. As Figure 4.3 
shows, services employment has been predominant in the United States 
for more than 30 years, and the services sector now accounts for 70 per-
cent of total civilian employment (GPO Access 2007, Table B46). Most 
observers believe that the scope of services offshoring will be large, 
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even huge. Here is an example, from the Web site of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Science and Technology: 
Recently, however, offshoring has begun to strike at the very high-
tech jobs that we believed U.S. workers would move to fi ll as 
blue-collar opportunities shifted to other countries.  A Cable News 
Network report in early March 2006 noted that 500,000 American 
jobs have migrated to India in recent years. That number is ex-
pected to triple in the next two years as American companies seek 
to cuts costs and streamline business.  India is but one example of 
a country that seems to be gaining employment at the expense of 
American workers. Over the last six years, the U.S. has lost just 
under 3 million jobs due to offshoring.
Figure 4.1  U.S. Net Exports of Services, 1992–2005
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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Now, we are witnessing software engineering, computer design, 
research and development, radiology, architecture and design and 
other high-value-added positions moving offshore to low-wage 
markets such as India, China, Ireland, and Brazil (Committee on 
Science and Technology 2006).
Jensen and Kletzer (2006) developed a new empirical approach to 
identify, at a detailed level, service activities that are potentially exposed 
to international trade. The approach uses the geographic concentration 
of service activities within the United States to identify which service 
activities are traded domestically, then classifi es activities that are trad-
ed domestically as potentially tradable internationally. With the trad-
ability classifi cation, we developed estimates of the number of workers 
who are in tradable activities for all sectors of the economy. The paper 
offers comparisons of the demographic characteristics of workers in 
tradable and nontradable activities and employment growth in traded 
and nontraded service activities. The tradability designation also allows 
an examination of the risk of job loss and other employment outcomes 
for workers in tradable activities. 
Figure 4.2  U.S. Trade in Goods, 1992–2005
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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The Jensen and Kletzer methodology fi nds substantial employment 
in tradable service industries and occupations. Given the overall size 
of the services sector, it may not be surprising that more workers are 
employed in tradable industries in the services sector than in the manu-
facturing sector. Outside of education, health care, and personal care 
occupations, the typical white-collar occupation involves a potentially 
tradable activity. Workers in these industries and occupations are more 
highly skilled and have higher incomes than workers in the manufactur-
ing sector and nontradable service activities. But the higher incomes are 
not solely a result of higher skill levels—in regressions controlling for 
observable characteristics, workers in select tradable service activities 
earn 16–17 percent higher incomes than similar workers in nontradable 
activities in the same sector.
There is little evidence that tradable service industries or occupa-
tions have lower employment growth than nontradable industries or 
occupations overall, though employment growth is negative for trad-
able services at the low end of the skill distribution. High-skill service 
activities have the highest employment growth rates.
Figure 4.3  U.S. Employment by Aggregated Sector, 1970–2006
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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While the share of employment in tradable services is large, this 
does not suggest that all or even most of these jobs are likely to move 
offshore. Just because an activity is tradable does not necessarily mean 
that the job will move to a lower-cost location. Tradable services are 
largely consistent with U.S. comparative advantage. While professional 
and business services are more skilled and higher paying than manufac-
turing in general, tradable services within these sectors are even more 
highly skilled and more highly paid than nontradable service activities. 
As technological and organizational change increases the potential for 
trade in services, economic activity within the United States will shift 
to activities consistent with comparative advantage. Because these ac-
tivities are consistent with U.S. comparative advantage, it is possible 
that further liberalization in international services trade would directly 
benefi t workers and fi rms in the United States. 
Jensen and Kletzer (2007) extend the examination of tradable jobs 
with a focus on the task and activity content of jobs, in order to develop 
measures of the occupational job tasks, activities, and characteristics 
associated with potential offshoring. The literature on offshoring notes 
that movable jobs are those with the following characteristics: little 
face-to-face customer contact, high information content, and a work 
process that is Internet-enabled or telecommutable (Bardhan and Kroll 
2003; Blinder 2006; Dossani and Kenney 2003). More informally, it is 
commonly believed that if the output of a job can be sent down a wire 
(or sent wireless), that job is offshorable. 
The next step involves an operational assessment of how the basic 
principles of offshorability (high information content, remote from cus-
tomer, Internet-enabled) match up to the characteristics of “real” jobs. 
Detailed information on the content and context of jobs (occupations) 
is available from O*Net, a U.S. Department of Labor database of 450 
occupations. (O*Net is the successor to the well-known Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles.) For each of hundreds of occupations, O*Net con-
tains detailed qualitative information on job tasks, work activities (in-
teracting with computers, processing information), and work context 
(face-to-face discussions, work with others, work outdoors).
The Jensen and Kletzer index of offshorability (in which occupa-
tions are ranked based on a weighting of these characteristics) produces 
occupations that are “most tradable,” such as credit authorizers, data-
entry keyers, accountants, medical transcriptionists, market research 
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analysts, bookkeepers, and account clerks. Occupations at the bottom 
of the list, the “least tradable,” include crossing guards, massage thera-
pists, manicurists, and barbers. 
Blinder (2007) explores a subjective index based on various mea-
sures of face-to-face interaction: establishing and maintaining personal 
relationships, assisting and caring for others, performing for or working 
directly with the public, selling to others or infl uencing others, being 
aware of others’ reactions and understanding why they react as they 
do (social perceptiveness). He concludes that an objective index does 
poorly in assessing offshorability (as compared to his subjective assess-
ment, based on O*Net data). His subjective index does not incorporate 
any attributes related to amount of information content or to Internet 
enabling, nor does he consider the creativity or routineness of work.11 
Objective measures may well be preferred, given the number of oc-
cupations (more than 450) and the desire for replication. Using both 
production and nonproduction occupations, Blinder estimates that 30 to 
40 million workers are currently in potentially tradable jobs, based on 
May 2005 employment levels. 
An important question in moving forward is the time frame for the 
process of services offshoring. It is commonly believed (although un-
tested) that a phenomenon that takes years to be fully realized will be 
less disruptive than a more rapid structural change.
Much more is yet to be learned about the scale, scope, and labor 
market costs of services offshoring. Until then, it remains to be seen 
whether Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan (2004, pg. 94) were cor-
rect when they pronounced that “outsourcing is fundamentally just a 
trade phenomenon; that is, subject to the usual theoretical caveats and 
practical responses, outsourcing leads to gains from trade, and its ef-
fects on jobs and wages are not qualitatively different from those of 
conventional trade in goods.”12
Services offshoring is one aspect of a larger concept that we might 
call “global operations.” Briefl y, global operations allow fi rms to ac-
cess new markets and new sources of revenue, technologies, and ways 
of production. As fi rms globalize their business operations, there are 
implications for work and for workers. Much attention is paid to cost 
reduction (largely in the form of wages) as a motivator; other factors 
include proximity to global customers and enhanced abilities to meet 
customers’ expectations that they should be able to reach a representa-
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tive at any time of day or night. See Gereffi  (2005) for a comprehensive 
introduction to research on global supply chains. 
Skills and Immigration
The immigration debate is occurring at both ends of the skill spec-
trum. While headline coverage is often limited to undocumented (and 
lesser-skilled) migration, Web sites and the business press provide 
ample evidence of a heated debate about legally admitted, temporary, 
high-skill foreign workers. At the high-skill end, the real debate may 
be over whether or not a shortage exists of (legally residing, not neces-
sarily native) computer programmers, systems analysts, and computer 
scientists. Claims of a shortage buttress arguments for more liberal H-
1B caps.13 These claims arose in the late 1990s, as the labor market 
tightened with strong economic growth and with the peak of the dot-
com boom. 
The United States is a net importer of the highly educated, par-
ticularly of scientists and engineers. There is little doubt that foreigners 
help the United States maintain its position at the technological frontier. 
“Leadership in science and technology gives the U.S. its comparative 
advantage in the global economy,” writes Freeman (2006a, p. 124). 
“U.S. exports are disproportionately from sectors that rely extensively 
on scientifi c and engineering workers and that embody the newest tech-
nologies. . . . In a knowledge-based economy, leadership in science and 
technology contributes substantially to economic success.”
Highly skilled immigrants play a prominent role in the economy. In 
2003, the foreign-born accounted for about 13.0 percent of the popu-
lation, 14.4 percent of the total adult workforce, and 17.2 percent of 
young adult workers (Figure 4.4). As Figure 4.4 illustrates, the share 
of foreign-born in the workforce has risen considerably since the late 
1990s. The foreign-born are well-educated (particularly advanced de-
gree holders). In 2002, they made up 16.2 percent of science, technol-
ogy, engineering, and mathematical (STEM) occupations and 18.4 per-
cent of core STEM (excluding social scientists and technicians) occu-
pations (Figure 4.5). Foreign-born workers are particularly important in 
computer science occupations. Foreign-born STEM workers are more 
likely to have advanced degrees than natives, and the vast majority of 
both natives and foreign-born have degrees from U.S. institutions.
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Figure 4.4  Percentage of Foreign-Born in the U.S. Workforce
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Figure 4.5  Foreign-Born as a Percentage of STEM Occupations, 
1994–2002
SOURCE: Commission on Professionals in Science and Technology.
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Saxenian (2002) notes the role of immigrants in Silicon Valley en-
trepreneurship. Wadhwa et al. (2007) update and expand that study and 
fi nd that one-quarter of engineering and technology companies started 
between 1995 and 2005 had at least one foreign-born founder. Freeman 
(2006a) reports that 60 percent of the growth in the number of U.S.-
based scientists and engineers over the decade of the 1990s came from 
the foreign-born. There is a critical question about maintaining U.S. 
comparative advantage in the absence of highly educated immigrants. 
With higher earnings, more domestic (or native) workers could be at-
tracted to science and engineering fi elds, but this will take time. With-
out adequate supply, more research and development could be located 
offshore. Yet maintaining the fl ow of foreign-born scientists and engi-
neers might lessen earnings growth, making it diffi cult to attract native 
students into science and engineering fi elds.
Since 1965, U.S. immigrant policy has been strongly based in fam-
ily reunifi cation. (Before 1965, immigrant admission was based on na-
tional origin.) The focus of the debate over skilled migrants is not about 
immigrant entry, but rather about nonimmigrant entry, the visa category 
of H-1B. 
The H-1 nonimmigrant category was created under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952 to assist U.S. employers needing workers 
temporarily.14 Nonimmigrants are foreign nationals who come to the 
U.S. on a temporary basis and for a specifi c purpose, such as school-
ing or work. The H-1B program was created by the Immigration Act 
of 1990, amending the 1952 Act. The H-1B program allows an em-
ployer to temporarily employ a foreign worker in the United States on 
a nonimmigrant basis in a specialty occupation or as “a fashion model 
of distinguished merit and ability.” A specialty occupation requires the 
theoretical and practical application of a body of specialized knowledge 
and a bachelor’s degree or the equivalent in the specifi c specialty (e.g., 
sciences, medicine and health care, education, biotechnology, and busi-
ness specialties). The 1990 act, which is current law, limits the number 
of foreign workers who may be issued a visa or otherwise be provided 
H-1B status to 65,000 a year. 
In 1998, Congress increased the H-1B cap to 115,000 for fi scal 
years 1999 and 2000. In 2000, Congress set the cap higher, at 195,000 
for fi scal year 2001. That level was maintained for fi scal years 2002 and 
2003. From fi scal year 2004 on, the cap has reverted back to 65,000.15 
tb08fogjch4.indd   134 9/10/2008   12:45:29 PM
Trade and Immigration   135
Under the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004, H-1B workers hired by in-
stitutions of higher education, nonprofi ts, and government research or-
ganizations are exempt from the cap. There is a separate 20,000 cap on 
H-1B petitions fi led on behalf of aliens with U.S.-earned master’s or 
higher degrees. An H-1B visa is generally valid for three years of em-
ployment and is renewable for an additional three years. From an H-1B 
visa, individuals may apply for permanent residency status.
To hire a foreign worker on H-1B visa status, the U.S. employer 
fi les a labor condition application (LCA) with the U.S. Department 
of Labor’s Employment and Training Administration. On the applica-
tion, the employer must attest to meeting the following four conditions: 
1) paying at least the local prevailing wage, or the employer’s actual 
wage, whichever is higher; 2) offering nonimmigrants benefi ts on the 
same basis as U.S. workers receive; 3) that employment of H-1B non-
immigrants must not adversely affect the working conditions of U.S. 
workers; and 4) that no strike or lockout exists in the occupational clas-
sifi cation at the place of employment. In addition, the employer must 
attest to notifying employees, at the place of employment, of the intent 
to employ H-1B workers.
Employers who are “H-1B dependent”—that is, whose workforce 
is comprised of 15 percent or more H-1B employees—face additional 
requirements. These requirements include attesting to the following 
three conditions: 1) no U.S. workers displaced within a period of 90 
days before or 90 days after fi ling an LCA petition; 2) good-faith steps 
were taken before fi ling the LCA to recruit U.S. workers and the job 
was offered to a U.S. applicant equally or better qualifi ed than an H-1B 
worker; and 3) before placing the H-1B worker with another employer, 
the fi rst employer inquired and has no knowledge as to that employer’s 
action or intent to displace a U.S. worker within the 90 days before or 
90 days after the placement of the H-1B worker with that employer.16
Information on worker characteristics is available from petitions to 
Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) for visas. These petitions 
are not, however, clear proxies for admission. Petitions are used to 
sponsor initial employment, continued employment, a change in em-
ployer (for someone already in the United States with H-1B status), or 
a change in location with the same employer. The total number of peti-
tions therefore greatly exceeds the number of foreigners with nonimmi-
grant status. By country of origin, India, China, and Canada accounted 
tb08fogjch4.indd   135 9/10/2008   12:45:29 PM
136   Kletzer
for 58 percent of fi scal year 2005 petitions (44 percent, 9.2 percent, and 
4.4 percent, respectively). Sixty-fi ve percent of approved petitions were 
for workers between 25 and 34 years of age; 45 percent for workers 
with a bachelor’s degree, 37 percent for those with a master’s degree, 
5 percent for those with a doctorate, and 12 percent for those with a 
professional degree. Forty-three percent went to those in computer-
related occupations; 12 percent to those in architecture, engineering, 
and surveying; 10.9 percent to those in education (CIS 2006).
Hira (2007) argues that the above LCA conditions do not constitute 
a “labor market test,” in the sense that employers can hire H-1B work-
ers even (as worded by the U.S. Department of Labor) “when a quali-
fi ed U.S. worker wants the job, and a U.S. worker can be displaced from 
the job in favor of the foreign worker” (pg. 2). Only H-1B–dependent 
employers face more stringent requirements about not displacing na-
tive (resident) workers. Hira also sees the following problems from the 
H-1B program and any proposed expansion: more offshore outsourc-
ing of jobs, displacement of American technology workers, decreased 
wages and job opportunities for domestic workers, and discouragement 
of young Americans from entering science and engineering fi elds. 
Hira’s unique contribution to the debate is his assertion that the H-
1B program promotes offshoring. He argues that the biggest users of 
H-1B visas are offshore outsourcing fi rms, and that these fi rms do not 
sponsor permanent resident status for their workers; rather, they train 
them in the United States and send those workers, along with the pro-
duction, back to the country of origin. According to Hira’s analysis of 
data from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Offi ce of Foreign Labor Cer-
tifi cation (OFLC), the top 11 (and 15 of the top 20) H-1B requesters are 
fi rms that specialize in offshore outsourcing (Hira 2007, Table 1). These 
fi rms use H-1B (and L-1) workers as part of their knowledge transfer 
operations, rotating foreign workers to learn U.S. workers’ jobs. H-1B 
workers also provide on-site (domestic) presence for these fi rms with 
their customers.17
Proponents of H-1B argue that nonimmigrant workers are vital be-
cause of systematic shortages of native (or resident) technology (sci-
ence and engineering) workers. Yet standard labor market indicators 
yield little or mixed evidence of IT worker shortages. Wage or earnings 
growth is moderate (similar to that of other professionals); unemploy-
ment rates shot up in the dot-com bust and have now fallen. In a com-
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prehensive survey, Lowell (2001a) found little evidence of shortages. 
Private (trade) surveys do often conclude that there are shortages, but 
there is little corroboration from public use data. The growth in H-1B 
visas alone is not evidence of a shortage; other factors include back-
logs in the permanent visa application process, cyclical demand in main 
(IT) industries in the 1990s, strong U.S. economic growth, changes in 
global competition that create demand for foreign workers because of 
expansions of foreign markets, the growing importance of international 
students in U.S. institutions (students who stay in this country upon 
graduation and need to be transitioned from student visa status to a 
working visa). Healthy H-1B hiring, with an absence of clear evidence 
of shortages, is not a suffi cient argument for an expansion of the H-1B 
program. Expanded H-1B caps will create problems for the permanent 
residency component of immigration (where there are already consider-
able backlogs). 
Secondarily, proponents argue that the H-1B program is the point 
of entry for the world’s best and brightest and essential for maintaining 
U.S. competitiveness. Existing separately from the H-1B debate, but 
clearly confounded with it, is the widespread concern that the United 
States faces a problem in maintaining its position as the scientifi c and 
technological leader in the world and that loss of leadership threatens 
the nation’s future economic well-being and national security. Busi-
ness, science, and education groups have issued reports that highlight 
the value to the country of leadership in science and technology. More 
specifi cally, numerous reports highlight the contribution of immigrants 
in innovative fi elds. In a report on the entrepreneurial economy, the 
Kauffman Foundation (2007) advocated an “entrepreneurial immigra-
tion policy” of raising H-1B quotas in the short term and eliminating 
them in the long term. There is also advocacy of new policies to increase 
the supply of scientifi c and engineering talent in the United States.18
A central charge is that employment of H-1B visa holders comes 
at a cost to older native-born workers, particularly engineers and tech-
nology (computer) workers, in terms of both wages and employment. 
Serious data limitations have prevented economists from doing much 
analysis on the question of the impact of H-1B visas on the wages and 
employment of U.S. workers.19 The National Research Council (2001) 
concludes that the magnitude of a wage effect caused by the H-1B pro-
gram is diffi cult to estimate. That report suggests that the H-1B program 
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has an effect in keeping wages from rising as quickly as they might in 
the absence of an H-1B program (Lowell 1999, 2000a,b, 2001a,b). Za-
vodny (2003), using Department of Labor LCA data for fi scal year 2001 
across states, found no relationship between share of H-1B workers and 
domestic earnings, earnings growth, or unemployment.20 
As the fraction of doctoral degrees awarded to foreign students has 
risen (from 11.3 to 24.4 percent between 1976 and 2000), there is a 
natural question about labor market competition: do foreign student 
doctorates harm the economic opportunities of native doctorates? Bor-
jas (2005a) estimates factor price elasticities and fi nds that an immigra-
tion-induced 10 percent increase in the supply of doctorates lowers the 
wages of competing workers by about 3 percent. 
Thinking About Immigration Policy
A successful immigration policy is a challenge to build, given the 
lack of clear political alignments, contradictory empirical evidence, 
strong emotions, and confl icting political ideologies. It is easy to think 
of immigration as a “problem.” But as Marshall (2007, pg. 1) advises,
Immigration is not the problem: the United States is and will re-
main a nation of immigrants, who have contributed greatly to the 
vitality, diversity, and creativity of American life. Immigrants are 
particularly important to the U.S. economy, accounting for over 
half of the workforce growth during the 1990s and 86 percent 
of the increase in employment between 2000 and 2005. Because 
there will be no net increase in the number of prime-working-age 
natives (aged 25 to 54) for the next 20 years, the strength of the 
American economy could depend heavily on how the nation re-
lates immigration to economic and social policy. 
The most heated issues in the current immigration policy reform de-
bate lie outside the boundaries of traditional economic policy thinking. 
Questions of culture, language, race, ethnicity, and geography trump 
economics now, and they could continue to do so. Current immigration 
policy is based on family unifi cation, not economics. The small eco-
nomic costs of immigration do not provide justifi cation for an econom-
ics-based policy. As Borjas (1999a,b) argues, evidence alone (whether 
economic or not) cannot decide the course of immigration policy.21 
There needs to be an explicit understanding of national interest—what 
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it is that Americans intend from an immigration policy. Borjas suggests 
consideration of three groups, whose interests may be in confl ict: peo-
ple living in the United States (“natives”), potential immigrants, and 
people who remain in the source countries. Most discussions attach the 
largest weight to the interests of natives. Even with this simplifi cation, 
economic interests need to be defi ned: as Borjas asks, is it the size of 
economic pie (national income, or per capital income), or the splitting 
of the slices of the pie (distribution of income)? 
This last question has a straightforward answer: like trade, the eco-
nomic impact of immigration is distributional. The net impact is rela-
tively small (a small increase in net national income), with losses (also 
small) concentrated among the less-skilled, and gains accruing to the 
skilled and owners of capital.22 Borjas (1999b) states in plain terms, 
“The debate over how many and which types of immigrants to admit is 
best viewed as a tug-of-war between those who gain from immigration 
and those who lose from it” (p. 185). Yet, unlike trade, the policy “solu-
tion” for immigration is likely to involve regulation of the fl ow, while 
for trade the solution involves addressing adjustment costs. In this way, 
immigration policy stands out from trade and fi nancial policy in the 
context of globalization. As countries have moved to liberalize fl ows of 
goods, services, and capital, the climate for liberalized movements of 
people has distinctly cooled. Freeman (2006a) notes that opinion sur-
veys across the rich countries fi nd majority support for more restrictive 
immigration. 
An economics-based immigration policy may largely involve skill. 
Arguments for an entry system that favors skilled migrants include 
three considerations: 1) the skilled earn more, pay more taxes, and re-
quire fewer social services; 2) capital benefi ts from skilled migration 
(although Lewis [2005] sees production choices as endogenous to local 
relative skill supply, allowing capital to benefi t from less-skilled migra-
tion as well); and 3) skilled migrants also contribute to innovation and 
entrepreneurship (Wadhwa et al. 2007). On the national competitive-
ness front, there is advocacy of a high-skill immigration policy that 
would permit unrestricted H-1Bs and automatic citizenship to foreign 
nationals earning science and engineering graduate degrees from U.S. 
institutions (Kauffman Foundation 2007). 
Addressing the fl ow, presence, and impact of undocumented mi-
grants dominates current public discourse on immigration policy re-
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form. The “bipartisan immigration compromise,” as it has been com-
monly termed, is the current template for public discourse. Highlights 
and contentious issues of that compromise include the following: border 
security, legalizing the residency of undocumented migrants, a guest 
worker program, and a point system for future immigrants that rewards 
skill (measured as educational attainment, occupational qualifi cations, 
and English-language profi ciency). Other migration issues are also 
hotly contested, most prominently the H-1B visa program. Two bills 
were introduced in Spring 2007 to increase the allotment of H-1B visas 
while tightening the regulations regarding employer good-faith efforts 
to hire American workers fi rst and strengthening USDOL enforcement 
capabilities.23
CURRENT WORKER ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE POLICY 
AND PROGRAMS; MOVING AHEAD ON POLICY 
Regarding trade, the policy focus is on labor market adjustment 
programs. This section reviews the current policy landscape and looks 
ahead at possible reforms and expansions.
Current Policy Mix
The United States has a well-developed and broad set of labor mar-
ket adjustment policies and programs, with unemployment insurance 
(UI) at the center. Other programs include advance notice for major 
layoffs, which is mandated by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notifi cation (WARN) Act, and training and job search assistance, which 
is provided under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). The Trade Ad-
justment Assistance (TAA) program, created in 1962, provides adjust-
ment assistance to workers laid off as a result of international trade. 
The United States is unique among industrialized countries in providing 
special assistance to workers who have lost jobs because of increased 
imports or international shifts in the location of production.
The main benefi ts available through TAA are extended income 
support and training. The following summary comes from the GAO 
(2006a). By statute, the U.S. Department of Labor certifi es groups of 
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laid-off workers as potentially eligible for TAA benefi ts and services by 
investigating petitions fi led on behalf of workers. Petitions can be fi led 
by fi rms, unions, or groups of workers. Workers are eligible if laid off 
as a result of international trade and if they were involved in making 
a product, supplying component parts, or performing fi nishing work 
for directly affected fi rms. Historically, most eligible workers have lost 
jobs in the manufacturing sector. 
Under the current TAA program, eligible participants have access to 
the following assistance:
• Training—up to 130 weeks, including 104 weeks of vocational 
training and 26 weeks of remedial training (such as ESL or lan-
guage literacy). TAA-approved training must be full-time.
• Trade Readjustment Allowances (TRAs, or extended income 
support)—up to 104 weeks of extended income support, after 
the 26 weeks of standard UI is exhausted. By statute, the level 
of TRA support is set at the state’s UI benefi t level. The 104 
weeks include 78 weeks while participating in vocational train-
ing and an additional 26 weeks if remedial training is necessary. 
During the fi rst 26 weeks of TRA receipt, participants must be 
enrolled in training, have completed training, or have a waiver 
of the training requirement. Beyond the fi rst 26 weeks, receipt of 
TRA support is conditional on training enrollment. 
• Job search and relocation benefi ts.
• Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC). Eligible participants may 
receive an advanceable tax credit covering 65 percent of the 
health insurance premiums. To be HCTC-eligible, workers must 
be receiving TRA support, be eligible for TRA but still receiving 
standard UI (in both cases, in training), or be enrolled in ATAA 
(see below).
• Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance (ATAA)—a targeted 
program of wage insurance, designed for workers aged 50 and 
older who forgo training, become reemployed within 26 weeks, 
and experience a reduction in earnings from the old job to the 
new job. If annual earnings on the new job are $50,000 or less, 
the benefi t covers 50 percent of the difference between old and 
new job earnings, up to a maximum of $10,000 over two years.
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The narrow focus of TAA on manufacturing, while historically ap-
propriate given the predominance of goods (as opposed to services) in 
international trade, is becoming a serious point of contention. The U.S. 
Department of Labor follows a narrow interpretation in its eligibility 
determinations. The statute requires workers to prove that they lost their 
job from a fi rm that makes a product that is “similar to or like an im-
ported good.” The department’s interpretation of the word “good” has 
resulted in many denials of eligibility. As services offshoring continues 
to capture attention, this confl ict over interpretation will persist.
More generally, eligibility denial is a contentious issue. Workers, or 
worker groups, have appealed to the U.S. Court of International Trade, 
the court with jurisdiction over TAA. As noted by Kletzer and Rosen 
(2005), the Court is increasingly sharply critical of the Department of 
Labor’s decisions on denials. The Court’s opinion in the case of Former 
Employees of BMC Software Inc. vs. U.S. Secretary of Labor is illustra-
tive, and worth quoting at length:
Trade adjustment assistance programs historically have been—and 
today continue to be—touted as the quid pro quo for U.S. national 
policies of free trade.
As illustrated by the history of virtually every TAA case fi led with 
the court in recent years, the Labor Department’s standard investi-
gative modus operandi appears to be to target whichever element 
of a TAA claim the agency perceives to be the weakest, and—if the 
agency fi nds that that particular element is not satisfi ed—to deny 
the claim on that basis, with no investigation or analysis of the 
other elements of the claim. 
The TAA program is fundamentally broken, as evidenced by a 
number of key indicators, particularly the . . . extraordinarily high 
percentage of cases in which the agency reverses itself on appeal. 
Those statistics are a scathing indictment of the Labor Depart-
ment’s administration of the TAA program. 
In short, “there is something fundamentally wrong with the admin-
istration of the nation’s trade adjustment assistance programs if, 
as a practical matter, workers often must appeal their cases to the 
courts to secure the thorough investigation that the Labor Depart-
ment is obligated to conduct by law.”
The literature assessing TAA performance is limited, in large part 
because of the Labor Department’s paltry release of outcome and perfor-
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mance data. Decker and Corson (1995) is perhaps the most commonly 
cited study, and it was based not on (the nonexistent) publicly available 
data, but on data obtained through Mathematica’s contracted evaluation 
of TAA in 1993. The 2002 Trade Act mandated an evaluation, with data 
collection beginning in 2005 and a fi nal report to be issued by the end 
of 2008. GAO (2004) offers a preliminary assessment, based on contact 
with state workforce agencies, of the 2002 reforms. Kletzer and Rosen 
(2005) also offer an assessment, based on publicly available informa-
tion, and with an eye to policy reform. In the context of program evalu-
ation, GAO (2006b) notes serious administrative concerns about the 
collection of TAA program performance data, and of data on outcomes 
such as employment and earnings. As that GAO report concludes,
since the passage of the TAA Reform Act of 2002, the TAA pro-
gram has evolved to become one of the most important means to 
help the workers affected by our nation’s trade policies rejoin our 
nation’s workforce. The program has seen substantial increases in 
the population it serves and in the funds available to serve them. 
Unfortunately, efforts to monitor the program’s performance have 
not kept pace with the program’s development. Four years after the 
passage of the reforms, we still do not know whether the program 
is achieving what lawmakers intended. 
In the current budgetary environment, with many claims on limited 
discretionary funds, it is increasingly important to have performance 
data and assessments. 
Two of the 2002 reforms, the health care tax credit and wage in-
surance (ATAA), have received considerable recent attention (Andrews 
2007). A number of recent policy-related studies and articles address 
the costs and benefi ts of wage insurance (Brainard, Litan, and War-
ren 2006; Kletzer and Rosen 2006; Kling 2006). While these debates 
are a vital component of policy discourse, it is frustrating to note that 
virtually nothing is known about the effi cacy of these two program ad-
ditions. Kletzer and Rosen’s (2005) study predates any real numbers on 
ATAA take-up, and surprisingly little has been learned since late 2004. 
GAO (2006a) concludes that
while few workers took advantage of training and long-term in-
come support through the TAA program, even fewer made use of 
two new benefi ts under the TAA program—health insurance as-
sistance and wage insurance for older workers. Workers who knew 
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about the benefi ts sometimes told us that the benefi t levels were 
not high enough to get them to participate. But relatively large 
numbers were simply not aware of the benefi ts, and some said they 
might have applied for the benefi ts had they known about them. 
Sometimes workers admitted to being overwhelmed by the pros-
pect of losing their jobs and by the wealth of information they 
initially received. However, states’ efforts to inform workers about 
and explain these benefi ts have been mixed at best—some trained 
their case managers to answer questions from workers, while oth-
ers did not see that as their role. Despite Labor’s efforts to encour-
age states to make this information more widely available, many 
workers still do not know about these benefi ts and, as a result, can-
not make use of them. Without better information, these workers 
may not have the opportunity to avail themselves of benefi ts that 
could ease their transition to reemployment.
MOVING AHEAD ON POLICY—SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
A Democratically controlled Congress facing a lame-duck Republi-
can administration, and a costly war in Iraq, are impediments to the goal 
of progress on the globalization policy agenda. Public skepticism about 
the benefi ts of trade expansion further complicates the picture. With 
all these complexities, it may not be possible to set out an economi-
cally defensible policy plan that is also politically feasible. Thus the 
discussion here will focus on the former, and leave the latter to political 
professionals.24
Any policy discussion must recognize the highly dynamic nature of 
the U.S. labor market, in which millions of jobs are created and lost each 
year. A fl exible labor market can benefi t an economy, especially when 
workers are able to move from low- to high-productivity jobs. Young 
workers benefi t from turnover, since they gain skills and experience 
and fi nd productive matches with a sequence of employers. At the same 
time, labor market fl exibility can impose signifi cant costs on workers 
and their families. Workers can experience prolonged unemployment, 
and once reemployed they may experience large and persistent earnings 
losses. In a rapidly changing economy, workers lose jobs for many rea-
sons (domestic competition, technological change, plant or offi ce relo-
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cation), and, as shown in Kletzer (2001), there is very little variation in 
the reemployment earnings consequences: losing a job is costly, regard-
less of reason. Analysis of data from the Dislocated Worker Survey re-
veals that only two-thirds of unemployed workers fi nd a new job within 
one to three years after layoff. More than 40 percent of workers expe-
rience earnings losses. Only about one-fourth of workers experience 
no earnings loss or an improvement in earnings after reemployment. 
Preliminary evidence on the reemployment consequences of services 
job loss, as reported in Jensen and Kletzer (2006), suggests little reason 
to temper this conclusion on costly job loss. The numbers of workers 
facing job displacement are signifi cant: over the 2003–2005 period, 1.8 
million workers were displaced from manufacturing industries, and 3.7 
million workers were displaced from services industries (down from 
the 2001–2003 period, when 2.9 million workers were displaced from 
manufacturing and 4.9 million were displaced from services).25
Calls for reform are timely, based on workers’ needs, which are 
unmet by current programs. It may, however, be time to reconsider the 
usual ways of advocating assistance policy. Consider the legislative his-
tory of TAA. President Kennedy and Congress established the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program in 1962 to provide assistance 
to workers who lose jobs because of increased import competition. 
The unique manner in which international trade policy is conducted in 
the United States, along with the modest level of existing adjustment 
assistance, played a role in the establishment of TAA. Congress must 
transfer, temporarily, authority to the president in order for the admin-
istration to participate in trade negotiations. This transfer of authority 
(now called trade promotion authority) gives Congress an opportunity 
to infl uence the negotiating agenda. Just as importantly, Congress gets 
a chance to pass legislation to compensate workers adversely affected 
by changes in foreign competition associated with trade agreements. As 
a result, expansions of TAA programs have been highly correlated with 
efforts to liberalize trade. This is the framework in which TAA has been 
seen as a quid pro quo for congressional support of trade-liberalizing 
legislation. As noted by Kletzer and Rosen (2005), reforms to TAA in 
the 1980s, the creation of NAFTA-TAA, and the 2002 reforms to TAA 
all fi t into this framework of mustering votes to pass trade legislation. 
There is a view that little additional gain accrues from assistance 
programs targeted at trade-displaced workers. TAA does not receive 
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much support from organized labor. On a practical basis, unions do 
work to ensure that workers receive assistance, yet their political sup-
port is tepid out of fear that out-and-out support will weaken unions’ 
priority position against trade liberalization. With TAA as assistance 
after job loss (and modest levels of assistance at that), the program is 
often sarcastically referred to as “burial insurance” among union lead-
ers. The same arguments exist for organized labor’s lukewarm response 
to wage insurance (Andrews 2007). As analyzed by Destler (2005), the 
2002 reforms to TAA, as part of the Trade Act of 2002 that granted 
trade promotion authority to the president, gained little additional Dem-
ocratic support. TAA is viewed by many as “a backwater government 
program that gets attention only when an administration needs votes for 
trade legislation” (Destler 2005, p. 328). A broad program of assistance 
to all displaced workers is more justifi able on the economic costs of job 
loss and is likely to more broadly address public anxieties about job in-
security. In addition, a general program of adjustment assistance avoids 
politicizing (or demonizing) any one particular cause of job loss, such 
as free trade and globalization. 
In turning to a broad program of assistance to all displaced workers, 
we should recognize that a comprehensive reform strategy starts with 
reforming UI. Unfortunately, political will does not currently seem to 
exist to signifi cantly reform UI. Short of UI reform, the next best alter-
native would be to continue expanding TAA eligibility to include more 
workers, specifi cally those adversely affected by the various aspects of 
globalization. An expanded TAA program would be in addition to the 
existing UI system. Rosen (2007) suggests the following parameters, in 
a program that would be renamed Globalization Adjustment Assistance 
(GAA).
Eligibility
The existing eligibility test, i.e., the association between 1) an in-
crease in imports or a shift in production and 2) a decline in output and 
employment, is tedious, diffi cult to implement, and subject to judicial 
objection. In addition the USDOL currently does not consider workers 
who are employed in the service sector as producing “an article” and 
thus deems them ineligible for TAA. The problem of covering service 
workers is exacerbated by the absence of detailed service import data, 
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which makes it diffi cult to show that a decline in output and employ-
ment is associated with an increase in service imports.
One alternative would be to move toward more qualitative eligibil-
ity criteria. Criteria would be developed to determine if an entire in-
dustry, occupation, or region was considered to be under distress. Once 
this determination was made, any worker losing a job from that in-
dustry, occupation, or region would only need to prove membership in 
any of these groupings in order to receive assistance under the revised 
program. This reform would reduce the discrimination between similar 
workers and also signifi cantly reduce the bureaucratic burden associ-
ated with administering the program.
Criteria to determine industry distress could include some combina-
tion of declines in sales and output, increases in imports, and job loss 
throughout the entire industry or occupation, not just a single fi rm. The 
addition of occupations as a potential eligible grouping is necessary due 
to the task-oriented (or occupation-oriented) nature of services offshor-
ing. High unemployment, plant closings, and vacancies could be used 
to identify regions under distress. 
Financial Assistance
The current system of providing 78 weeks of income maintenance 
at the UI rate if a worker is enrolled in training (a provision that goes 
well beyond the traditional 26 weeks of UI) would continue to be the 
central aspect of the program. The adjustment burden of workers chang-
ing industry or occupation is high (Kletzer 2001). Longer duration of 
income maintenance enables workers to enroll in signifi cant training 
and thereby make a serious adjustment. In the case of regional distress, 
income maintenance payments can help stimulate the local economy.
Training
Training funds are inadequate, and many states exhaust their allo-
cation before the end of the year. Income maintenance payments under 
TAA are an entitlement—i.e., Congress must appropriate enough mon-
ey to provide income maintenance payments to all eligible workers. In 
contrast, appropriation of training funds is considered a “capped en-
titlement,” for which Congress sets an appropriation cap on the amount 
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of total funding for training. It is inconsistent to make entitled income 
maintenance payments conditional on (limited) training enrollment.26 
In addition, given the training appropriation cap, all workers may not 
receive the same amount or quality of training. Raising the training ap-
propriation cap would begin to address this problem. 
Health Coverage Tax Credit
Currently, workers participating in TAA can receive a 65 percent 
advanceable, refundable tax credit to help cover the cost of maintain-
ing health insurance during the period of unemployment. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that workers fi nd the Health Coverage Tax Credit 
(HCTC) to be the most valuable form of assistance offered under the 
TAA program. On the other hand, the GAO (2006a) fi nds that many 
workers claim they cannot afford to pay the remaining 35 percent in or-
der to maintain their health insurance. To remedy this, the HCTC could 
be increased to 75 percent. In addition, states could be encouraged to 
offer some assistance, thereby reducing workers’ out-of-pocket expen-
ditures even more. 
Wage Insurance
Wage insurance offers assistance that is tailored to actual earnings 
losses. In order to be effective, wage-loss insurance must be a comple-
ment to traditional UI, since it only assists those workers who fi nd new 
jobs. Under the program, eligible workers would receive some fraction—
perhaps half—of their weekly earnings loss over a specifi c period. 
For example, between 1979 and 2001, the average weekly wage 
before layoff for workers displaced from manufacturing industries was 
$396.88. At the same time, the average weekly wage for those laid off 
from nonmanufacturing jobs was $368.65. For those workers who found 
new jobs, the average percentage loss in earnings was 29.2 percent for 
manufacturing workers and 18.6 percent for nonmanufacturing work-
ers. Had a wage-loss insurance program been in place, manufacturing 
workers would have received approximately $6,000 over a two-year 
period, which is 15 percent of their prelayoff wage. Nonmanufacturing 
workers would have received approximately $3,600 over a two-year 
period, which is equal to 9 percent of their prelayoff wage. 
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Despite its benefi ts, wage insurance is not a perfect solution to ad-
dressing the costs associated with unemployment. Structuring a pro-
gram with a relatively short eligibility period, which would start with 
the date of job loss, creates a reemployment incentive and addresses 
one of the most commonly expressed UI concerns, but it also limits the 
compensatory nature of the program. Displaced worker earnings losses 
are long-term (earnings losses exist for fi ve to six years after job loss), 
well beyond the two years covered by ATAA.
The cost of a wage insurance program depends on the number of 
eligible workers, the earnings losses of those reemployed at lower pay, 
and the duration of unemployment prior to reemployment. Other criti-
cal program characteristics include the duration of wage insurance pay-
ments, the annual cap on program payments, and the replacement rate. 
It has been estimated that the cost for a program with a two-year dura-
tion, a 50 percent replacement rate, and a $10,000 annual cap for all 
dislocated workers would be around $4 billion. 
The Trade Act of 2002 established a wage insurance program, for-
mally called Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance (ATAA). ATAA 
encourages and provides fi nancial assistance to workers who return 
to work within 26 weeks after separation. It is possible that their new 
employers may provide on-the-job training, which is seen by many as 
more effective than classroom training. 
Financing an Expanded Program
The Offi ce of Management and Budget reports that current spending 
on TAA is approximately $1 billion a year. Kletzer and Rosen (2005) 
estimate that making all workers that have been displaced from im-
port-competing manufacturing industries eligible for TAA would cost 
approximately $3 billion a year. Including service workers could poten-
tially double the price tag. Increasing the HCTC and reducing the wage 
insurance age requirement could add another $1 billion to the total cost. 
These estimates are very tentative, but total spending on an assistance 
program sketched here could be in the range of $6–$7 billion a year. 
One immediate proposal for fi nancing the additional costs would be 
to raise the maximum taxable wage base currently used in calculating 
the UI payroll tax (the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, or FUTA). In 
addition to raising revenue to offset the additional expense associated 
tb08fogjch4.indd   149 9/10/2008   12:45:32 PM
150   Kletzer
with expanding the program, raising the maximum taxable wage base 
would also make the UI tax more progressive. The maximum wage 
base has been fi xed at $7,000 for more than 20 years. Adjusting the 
base to $45,000, over time, could be expected to raise an additional $9 
billion, enough to fi nance a program expansion.
A More Expansive Policy Reform
Should the political will exist (or be found) to engage in a more 
comprehensive reform of the nation’s worker assistance programs, the 
fi rst step would be UI reform.27 The original UI program was designed 
to offset income losses during cyclical periods of temporary involuntary 
unemployment. In contrast, current workers face long-term structural 
unemployment. The existing UI system is inadequate in responding to 
these current labor market conditions. 
The current UI system does not assist workers who seek part-time 
employment, workers who voluntarily leave one job in order to take 
another, or workers who experience long-term unemployment. New en-
trants and reentrants into the labor market are not currently eligible for 
UI, since these two groups of unemployed do not fi t well with one of 
the program’s original objectives, i.e., insuring against the risk of invol-
untary job loss. Covering these workers would raise issues concerning 
the amount and duration of assistance, since they may not have relevant 
work experience.
Underlining these macroeconomic changes to the U.S. labor market 
is a shift from traditional employer-based full-time employment to an 
increased reliance on contingent and part-time employment. The shift 
to these nontraditional forms of employment refl ects additional short-
falls in the current UI program. A system designed to provide income 
support during temporary layoffs for workers who were permanently 
attached to a single employer is not well designed for a labor market 
with considerable self-employment and contingent, part-time, and low-
wage employment. 
Although there clearly remain some differences in local labor mar-
ket conditions, the current pressures on the U.S. labor market are be-
coming more national. State differences in the incidence and experi-
ence of unemployment have narrowed considerably. Local labor market 
conditions primarily affect the prospects for reemployment. Given the 
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increasingly national nature of the labor market, UI would be better 
able to meet its original objectives if the federal government played a 
more prominent role in this state-federal partnership. 
In addition to inequities created by disparate rules across states, 
a signifi cant downside of the current federal-state partnership is the 
states’ real or perceived fears that program generosity will result in ad-
verse changes to their business environment. Increased federal leader-
ship would avoid interstate competition and a race to the bottom in 
program benefi ts.
An increased leadership role for the federal government would be 
characterized by expanding standards for eligibility, duration, and level 
of benefi ts, and for fi nancing the program. Recommendations include 
the following:
• Standardize the base period for determining eligibility to the past 
four complete calendar quarters prior to job loss. This change, 
already implemented by a number of states, updates the opera-
tional defi nition of labor market attachment and refl ects the re-
duced time needed to report earnings. 
• Use hours rather than earnings in determining eligibility. Shift-
ing the determination of eligibility to hours instead of earnings 
would bring more low- and moderate-wage workers—who often 
most need help during periods of unemployment—into the sys-
tem.
• Harmonize nonmonetary eligibility standards. The patchwork of 
nonmonetary eligibility criteria, in which some states consider 
voluntary separations for good cause while others do not, creates 
unnecessary complexity and inequities in the system. 
• Enable reentrants to the labor force, if it is determined retroac-
tively that they were eligible at the time of job loss or separation, 
to be eligible to receive the benefi ts they would have received at 
the time of job loss. In a fl uid labor market, many workers may 
leave the labor force for some time (e.g., to care for a child or 
parent) and then return. If the workers were eligible for UI when 
they separated from their previous job but did not claim them at 
that time, they should be eligible for benefi ts when they return to 
the labor force.
tb08fogjch4.indd   151 9/10/2008   12:45:33 PM
152   Kletzer
• Amend the work test to allow job search for part-time employ-
ment. Part-time work is a common feature of the current labor 
market, accounting for 16 percent of employment in July 2006, 
and unemployed workers should not be disqualifi ed from receiv-
ing benefi ts because they are searching for part-time work.
The share of unemployed workers who actually received assistance 
under the UI program averaged 37 percent between 1980 and 2005. The 
proposals outlined above are designed to increase the number and share 
of unemployed workers eligible to receive assistance. Table 4.1 reports 
estimates for the costs associated with raising the recipiency rate in 
increments to 50 percent. 
A more comprehensive reform would bring the fuller set of assis-
tance programs into the twenty-fi rst century. The basic structure of cur-
rent UI was designed for a system of single employers, full-time work, 
and cyclical temporary layoff. The workforce today faces permanent 
job loss, part-time or contingent work, and self-employment. In addi-
tion, technological change and intensifi ed competition from globaliza-
tion create increased pressures and anxieties. 
CONCLUSION
The U.S. debate about trade and immigration is broadening to in-
clude higher skilled workers. The growing services trade potentially 
broadens the group of workers at risk of displacement. Migration and 
immigration of skilled workers also may be perceived as a threat to 
higher skilled U.S. workers. 
Trade-displaced manufacturing workers may lose over $50 billion 
in lifetime earnings, and there are additional service workers’ losses. 
Federal spending on Trade Adjustment Assistance is less than $2 billion 
annually, due in part to restrictions on workers’ eligibility. Because the 
TAA statute refers to “imported goods,” virtually all displaced service 
workers are deemed ineligible for TAA. 
Most reviews conclude that immigration’s effects on native U.S. 
workers are small, in terms of wages and employment. High skill im-
migrants help the U.S. maintain technological leadership. 
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Strengthening programs of adjustment assistance is essential for 
maintaining any signifi cant level of public support for globalization ef-
forts. Eligibility for Trade Adjustment Assistance should be expanded 
to include services workers, and additional training dollars should be 
made available to program participants. The wage insurance program 
started in 2002, which provides trade-displaced workers over age 50 
with up to half the difference between their old and new wages, should 
be evaluated, with the possibility of expanding eligibility to workers in 
their 40s. Reforms to the unemployment insurance (UI) system should 
include allowances for reentrants and part-time employment and the 
addition of wage-loss insurance for all displaced workers. 
Skilled migration is critical for U.S. innovation. Ensuring that tem-
porary migrant workers have basic labor market rights, such as free 
mobility, may help lessen problems from more open immigration. 
Openness to fl ows of goods, services, people, and investment 
brings economic benefi ts to Americans. The same fl ows are also as-
sociated with economic costs, especially for competing workers, fi rms, 
and communities. Thus, it is the distribution of benefi ts and costs that 
is contentious and controversial. While the academic debate remains 
lively on the distributional questions and can be expected to continue, 
there is a clear need to strengthen the programs and policies in place to 
assist workers who are confronting job and income losses and the un-
certainties created by globalization and other structural change. 
Table 4.1  Estimated Costs Associated with Increasing the Recipiency Rate
Recipiency rate
Increase in number of 
workers eligible (thousands)a





a Increase in workers and costs (benefi ts paid) relative to 25-year average.
SOURCE: Kletzer and Rosen (2006). 
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 1. Gains to all countries do not necessarily follow on theoretical grounds. In ad-
dition, trade liberalization is only guaranteed to enhance welfare under certain 
limited theoretical conditions (including that the home economy is small, relative 
to world markets).
  2. Broda and Weinstein (2005) examine in more detail the gains from expanded va-
rieties of goods.
  3. Gresser (2002) showed that textile tariffs apply disproportionately to lower-end 
garments, purchased mainly by lower-income consumers.
  4. Gomory and Baumol (2000) present a model with similar outcomes, where gains 
from trade can shrink as competitors gain technological expertise. 
  5. See Rodrik (2006) for other skeptical thoughts on the benefi ts of free trade. He 
sees the evidence of the past 15 years as yielding no one single recipe for develop-
ing country growth, including policies of open trade.
  6. TAA has held center stage in the limited mix of worker adjustment policies since 
the mid-1970s. Overlapping with the evaluation literature, a number of papers 
consider the evidence on TAA and training for displaced workers. See Decker and 
Corson (1995) and Leigh (1990).
  7. The two-sides-of-the-same-coin analogy fi ts well in economy theory. In models of 
international trade based on differing factor endowments across countries, trade 
in goods and services or movements of factors of production can equalize prices 
and earnings. In an essay on international labor mobility, Freeman (2006b) notes 
that Mundell (1957) provides a model of substitutability between commodity 
movements and factor movements. If country A has more labor relative to capital 
than country B, A can send labor to B directly through immigration or indirect-
ly through the export of labor-intensive goods. Immigration restrictions should 
therefore result in an increase in trade. 
  8. Grossman (1982) was the fi rst in this approach. Card (2005) provides an updated 
summary.
  9. Most of the immigration literature focuses on impacts on lesser-skilled workers. 
Friedberg (2001) studied mass migration from the former Soviet Union to Israel, 
fi nding little effect on the earnings and employment of natives. The H-1B litera-
ture is even thinner, given data limitations. 
 10. Net exports (of either services or goods) is the difference between the value of 
exports and the value of imports—i.e., exports (in $) minus imports (in $).
 11. The routineness of work, or the codifi cation of tasks, is a characteristic empha-
sized by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003).
 12. Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (2004) seem to mean “offshoring” when 
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they use “outsourcing.” Their outsourcing is arms-length and located in a foreign 
country.
 13. As discussed in more detail below, the H-1B nonimmigrant work visa allows em-
ployers to temporarily employ foreign workers in the United States in a specialty 
occupation.
 14. GAO (2006c) is the source of information for this section.
 15. Over the recent past, employer demand for H-1B visas has greatly exceeded the 
cap. For fi scal 2007, the application cap was reached in May 2006. For fi scal 
2008, fi rst-day applications exceeded the cap, and Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (CIS) received a record 150,000 applications as of late afternoon on April 
2, 2007. For the fi rst time, applications will be placed in a computer-generated lot-
tery (Marcucci 2007).
 16. As noted in GAO (2006c), these additional requirements applied from January 
19, 2001, to September 30, 2003. The provision requiring these attestations ex-
pired, and was only reinstated on March 8, 2005. From October 1, 2003, to March 
7, 2005, H-1B–dependent employers and willful-violator employers were able to 
hire H1-B workers even if U.S. workers were displaced, and they did not have to 
undertake efforts to hire U.S. workers. 
 17. The L-1 nonimmigrant visa is for intracompany transfers.
 18. Freeman (2006b) proposes tripling the number of NSF graduate fellowships and 
increasing the size of the award to encourage advanced study in science and engi-
neering fi elds.
 19. See Matloff (2003) for a survey. 
 20. The problem with LCA data is that observations are applications, not actual visa 
issuances for workers. Wage information is the submitted prevailing wage, not the 
wage paid. 
 21. Chapter 1 of Borjas (1999b) contains a thoughtful discussion on the framing of a 
U.S. immigration policy.
 22. Focusing on California, Peri (2007) fi nds that immigrants are imperfect substi-
tutes for natives with similar education and age and that immigrant fl ows stimu-
lated, rather than harmed, the demand for—and the wages of—most U.S. native 
workers.
 23. The two bills are “The H-1B and L-1 Visa Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 
2007,” introduced by Senators Dick Durbin (D-IL) and Chuck Grassley (R-IA) 
and “The Skilled Worker Immigration and Fairness Act of 2007,” introduced by 
Senators Joe Lieberman (I-CT) and Chuck Hagel (R-NE). 
 24. See Destler (2005) for a broader discussion of a desirable direction for American 
trade policy.
 25. Based on author’s estimates from the 2004 and 2006 Displaced Worker Surveys. 
Overall manufacturing employment has declined by nearly 18 percent since 2000, 
while employment in the services sector has grown by 5.4 percent.
 26. Workers can apply for a waiver to excuse them from the requirement of enrolling 
in training in order to receive income maintenance payments.
 27. This section borrows heavily from Kletzer and Rosen (2006).
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